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COMMENT

The Last Days of Social Security Disability:
How the Social Security Administration's
Policies on the Submission of Adverse
Evidence and Non-Attorney Representation
Have Contributed to Its Institutional Failure
THOMAS KATSIOTAS†
INTRODUCTION
The Social Security disability1 system is dying. This
system has been considered “the largest adjudicatory system
in the world,”2 and millions of disabled Americans rely on it
for ongoing support. Nearly 6% of the American population
receives disability payments from the Social Security
Administration (“SSA”) every month.3 Even though more
† J.D. Candidate, Class of 2015, SUNY Buffalo Law School; B.A. in English, 2008,
Binghamton University. Special thanks to Amrita Maharaj, my fiancée, my best
friend, my law school classmate, and my conscripted editor. Also, thanks to Linda
Katsiotas, my mother, for her invaluable critique and edits on my draft. Lastly,
thanks to Kristen Flick, my editor at the Buffalo Law Review, for her hard work
in preparing my Comment for publication. However bad this Comment may be, it
is certainly better for their involvement.
1. For this Comment, when I refer to Social Security disability, I am referring
both to claims under Title II (including claims for Disability Insurance Benefits)
and Title XVI (Supplemental Security Income) of the Social Security Act.
2. Robert E. Rains, Professional Responsibility and Social Security
Representation: The Myth of the State-Bar Bar to Compliance with Federal Rules
on Production of Adverse Evidence, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 363, 364 (2007) (citing
Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 461 n.2 (1983)).
3. In 2013, Senator Tom Coburn testified before the United States House of
Representatives Committee on Oversight and Government Reform that “1 in 17
Americans today collect a disability check through the Social Security system.”
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than 161 million Americans4 contribute more than 503 billion
dollars into the system each year,5 this may not be enough.
By best estimates, the trust fund reserves that support
benefits payments will be depleted by 2016, at which point
there will only be enough money to pay 80% of benefits.6
At the same time that the fund is going broke, SSA has
attracted public attention for its institutional failures,7
stoked by reports that too many able individuals are
collecting disability checks.8 In 2011, the United States
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs’ Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations,
spearheaded by Senator Coburn, launched an investigation
into the quality of benefits award decisions.9 The resulting
2012 report, based on a sample of 300 claims, found that more
than 25% of benefits award decisions “failed to properly
address insufficient, contradictory, or incomplete evidence.”10
This 25% error rate is consistent with the 22% error rate
found by SSA itself in an internal audit conducted in 2011.11
Oversight of Rising Social Security Disability Claims and the Role of
Administrative Law Judges: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy Policy,
Health Care & Entitlements of the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform,
113th Cong. 2 (2013) (statement of Sen. Tom Coburn, M.D.) [hereinafter 2013
Oversight Hearing].
4. THE BD. OF TRS., FED. OLD-AGE & SURVIVORS INS. & FED. DISABILITY INS.
TRUST FUNDS, THE 2013 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE
FEDERAL OLD-AGE AND SURVIVORS INSURANCE AND FEDERAL DISABILITY INSURANCE
TRUST FUNDS 2 (2013) [hereinafter 2013 BOARD OF TRUSTEES REPORT].
5. Id. at 6.
6. According to the 2013 annual report from the Board of Trustees of the
Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Federal Disability Insurance Trust
Funds, “the [Disability Insurance] Trust Fund reserves become depleted in 2016,
at which time continuing income to the [Disability Insurance] Trust Fund would
be sufficient to pay 80 percent of [Disability Insurance] benefits.” Id. at 4.
7. See generally U.S. SENATE PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS OF
COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, MINORITY STAFF
REPORT, SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY PROGRAMS: IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF
BENEFIT AWARD DECISIONS (Sept. 12, 2012) [hereinafter MINORITY STAFF REPORT]
THE

8. Id. at 1.
9. See id. at 2-3.
10. Id. at 3-4.
11. Id. at 4.
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The nearly one-quarter error rate in awarding benefits is
especially alarming considering that once an applicant is
awarded disability benefits he will receive approximately
$300,000, on average, over the period he collects benefits.12
Further, once on the disability rolls, an individual will
“almost never return to the active workforce.”13
So how has the system gotten to this point? The answer
is attributable to a confluence of factors, two of which are
addressed in this Comment. These factors are two of SSA’s
policies: (1) SSA’s rules regarding the submission of adverse
evidence, discussed in Part II; and (2) the eligible nonattorney representative program initiated in 2004, discussed
in Part III. Equally important to the discussion of these two
policies is an understanding of the system in which these two
policies exist. This includes a discussion in Part I of the
system of claims adjudication under SSA and how the 2008
financial crisis affected that system.
I will argue that the two policies addressed have
contributed to a growing base of representatives able to
exploit the system for profit. Specifically, SSA’s policy for the
last several years on the submission of adverse evidence has
given these representatives the tools to do so, and its policy
on non-attorney representation has created a class of
representatives to use these tools. It is my contention that
the two policies are inapposite to SSA’s disability
adjudication system, which places great responsibility on
claimant representatives. As is explained below, the current
system is non-adversarial. The government is not
represented and relies on claimant representatives for
developing the record in hearings before Administrative Law
Judges (“ALJs”). Further, SSA only pays fees to
representatives if they win a claim, and, in recent years, has
been focused on granting disability claims. There is no room
12. See U.S. SENATE COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. & GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS,
STAFF REPORT, HOW SOME LEGAL, MEDICAL, AND JUDICIAL PROFESSIONALS ABUSED
SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY PROGRAMS FOR THE COUNTRY’S MOST VULNERABLE: A
CASE STUDY OF THE CONN LAW FIRM 5 n.9 (Oct. 4, 2013)[hereinafter CONN LAW
FIRM CASE STUDY]; Drew A. Swank, Money for Nothing: Five Small Steps to Begin
the Long Journey of Restoring Integrity to the Social Security Administration’s
Disability Programs, 41 HOFSTRA L. REV. 155, 170 (2012) [hereinafter Swank,
Money for Nothing].
13. Swank, Money for Nothing, supra note 12, at 179.
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in such a system for SSA polices that allow representatives
to submit only favorable evidence and allow unqualified
nonattorneys essentially unfettered by any regulation of
misconduct to practice. The existence of these two policies
within SSA’s system of claims adjudication has invariably led
to its institutional failure, as accelerated by the impact of the
2008 financial crisis.
I. BACKGROUND
In order to understand the background in which the two
polices addressed by this Comment operate, it is necessary to
understand both the basic adjudicatory structure of Social
Security disability claims and how the 2008 financial crisis
stressed and changed that structure.
A. The Basic Adjudicatory Structure of Social Security
Disability Claims
The process of claims adjudication starts when a
claimant files a claim for disability benefits.14 This claim is
then processed by a local SSA office, which will issue a first
determination on the claim; this is the Initial Level.15 If that
determination is unfavorable, in some states, a second person
will take a look at the application and issue a second
determination; this is the Reconsideration Level.16 Once a
final unfavorable determination has been made by the local
SSA office, either at the Initial or Reconsideration levels, a
request for a hearing before an ALJ can be filed.17 That
request is an appeal to the Hearing Level, and the case will
be transferred from the local SSA office to an Office of
Disability Adjudication and Review (“ODAR”).18 At the
14. 20 C.F.R. § 404.603 (2014).
15. See id. § 404.900(a)(1).
16. See id. § 404.900(a)(2).
17. See id. § 404.900(a)(3).
18. Each ODAR services the multiple local SSA offices that fall under it. For
example, the Buffalo ODAR serves the Batavia, Buffalo, Dunkirk, Jamestown,
Niagara Falls, Olean, and Ridge Road local SSA offices. Hearing Office Locator,
Office of Disability Adjudication and Review, SOC. SEC. ADMIN.,
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Hearing Level, a claim generally results in a hearing before
an ALJ, who will issue a decision on the claim.19 If this
decision is unfavorable or partially favorable, the claimant
may file a request for the review of the ALJ’s decision to the
Appeals Council; this is the Appeals Council Level.20 The
Appeals Council can then take one of three actions:
(1) vacate the ALJ’s decision and remand the claim back to
the Hearing Level for a new hearing; (2) deny the request for
review, making the ALJ’s decision the final decision of SSA;
or (3) vacate the ALJ’s decision and issue its own decision—
an outcome that very rarely occurs.21 If the Appeals Council
denies the request for review or issues its own decision, that
decision becomes the final decision of SSA.22
Most of the discussion in this Comment will deal with
issues that arise at the Hearing Level, the level in which
representatives and ALJs interact and in which most claims
are awarded.23 Though an appeal to the Hearing Level will
often result in a hearing before an ALJ, the process is
decidedly distinct from what we normally think of as a court
proceeding. The process is inquisitorial and nonadversarial,24 and the normal rules of evidence do not apply.25
As Justice Thomas has explained:
The differences between courts and agencies are nowhere more
pronounced than in Social Security proceedings. Although “[m]any
agency systems of adjudication are based to a significant extent on
http://www.socialsecurity.gov/appeals/ho_locator.html#vt=1 (last visited Mar. 3,
2015).
19. 20 C.F.R. § 404.929.
20. Id. § 404.967.
21. See id.
22. See id. § 404.981. The preceding paragraph is an abbreviated summary of
the process a claim takes from inception to final decision. While in reality there
are far more nuances and potential complications, this abbreviated summary
provides all the information necessary for a basic background understanding of
the process required to understand the issues presented in this Comment.
23. See 2013 Oversight Hearing, supra note 3, at 72-73.
24. 20 C.F.R. § 405.1(c)(1) (“In making a determination or decision on your
claim, we conduct the administrative review process in a non-adversarial
manner.”); see also Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 110-11 (2000).
25. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 400 (1971).
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the judicial model of decisionmaking, the SSA is “[p]erhaps the best
example of an agency” that is not. “The most important of [SSA’s
modifications of the judicial model] is the replacement of normal
adversary procedure by . . . the “investigatory model[.]” Social
Security proceedings are inquisitorial rather than adversarial. It is
the ALJ’s duty to investigate the facts and develop the arguments
both for and against granting benefits . . . . The Commissioner has
no representative before the ALJ to oppose the claim for
benefits . . . .26

The role of an ALJ in a Social Security hearing is to
consider the evidence brought before him, not to protect the
government’s interest. In fact, as Justice Thomas noted,
there is no party present at the hearing to represent the
government’s interest.27 However, the opposite is not true.
While claimants need not be represented,28 they may be, and
most in fact are.29 In practice, a claimant’s representative
conducts most record development, and the vast majority of
the evidence before an ALJ deciding a claim has been
submitted by a claimant’s representative. For this reason,
most ALJs consider the role of claimants’ representatives
necessarily integral to the process of adjudication, and they
rely on these representatives for guidance in deciding claims.
Generally, representatives earn fees based on fee
agreements with their clients that must be approved by SSA.
These fees are earned on a contingency basis; representatives
only get paid if a claimant is granted benefits. Fees are
allowed up to 25% of a claimant’s retroactive benefits
26. Sims, 530 U.S. at 110-11 (internal citations omitted).
27. See id.
28. See, e.g., id. at 118 (Breyer, J., dissenting); 20 C.F.R. § 405.1(c)(2) (“To help
you present your claim to us, you may have someone represent you, including an
attorney.”); Rains, supra note 2, at 364.
29. According to the Social Security Advisory Board (“SSAB”), in 2010,
attorney representatives were present at 74.6% of ALJ hearings, and nonattorney representatives were present at 19.3% (2010 is the most recent year for
which data is available). See SOC. SEC. ADVISORY BD., ASPECTS OF DISABILITY
DECISION MAKING: DATA AND MATERIALS 60 fig. 55 (Feb. 2012) [hereinafter SSAB
DATA], available at http://www.ssab.gov/Publications/Disability/GPO_Chartbook
_FINAL_06122012.pdf. Most recently, at the June 27, 2013 Oversight Hearing,
Deputy Commissioner of Disability Adjudication and Review for SSA, Glenn E.
Sklar, testified that up to 90% of all claimants are represented. 2013 Oversight
Hearing, supra note 3, at 158-59.
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award—the amount in past due benefits they are owed for
the period beginning from up to one year prior to their filing
through when their claim is ultimately granted30—to a
maximum set by law, which is currently $6000.31 If SSA
approves a fee agreement, those representatives who are
eligible—which includes attorneys and certain nonattorneys, as discussed in Part III—are paid their fees
directly from SSA out of the portion of retroactive benefits
withheld.32 It is this fee withholding and direct payment that
makes representation of Social Security disability claimants
a financially attractive practice. In the absence of
withholding and direct payment, a representative would
simply be an unsecured creditor of a claimant who may have
accrued several such creditors in the years it has taken for
his claim to resolve. The prospect of a representative
recovering a fee in that situation is expectedly low.
B. The 2008 Financial Crisis and the Social Security
Administration’s “Paying-Down-the-Backlog” Policy
Looking historically at claims adjudication under Social
Security, there are really two disability systems: the one that
existed before the 2008 financial crisis and the one that exists
now. One of the effects of the 2008 financial crisis was a
massive influx of applicants into the Social Security
disability system. The chart on the next page displays the
number of Disability Insurance applications filed from 2004
through 2010.33

30. Social Security Protection Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-203, 118 Stat. 493,
520 (2004).
31. See Maximum Dollar Limit in the Fee Agreement Process, 74 Fed. Reg.
6080, 6080 (Feb. 4, 2009).
32. Id.
33. SSAB DATA, supra note 29, at 6 fig. 1a (“Disability Insurance and
Supplemental Security Income Disability Applications—Calendar Years 1975 to
2010.”).
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DI applications
as percent of
Area
population
15-64

Year

Total DI
applications

Total DI
insured
15-64

2004

2,137,500

143,678,500

200,919,056

1.5%

1.1%

2005

2,122,100

145,351,700

203,629,140

1.5%

1.0%

2006

2,134,100

147,083,200

206,299,496

1.5%

1.0%

2007

2,190,200

148,652,600

208,817,317

1.5%

1.0%

2008

2,320,400

149,549,100

211,167,333

1.6%

1.1%

2009

2,816,200

150,630,157

212,662,737

1.9%

1.3%

2010

2,935,800

151,666,246

214,111,887

1.9%

1.4%

Table 1

The number of applications increased by 5.9% from 2007
to 2008, then by a massive 21.4% from 2008 to 2009, and then
by 4.2% from 2009 to 2010—the total increase from 2007 to
2010 being more than 34%. Additionally, the data shows that
the number of applications filed as a percentage of the
insured population and the number of applications filed as a
percentage of the eligible population34 spiked in 2008 and
continued to increase through 2010—the last year for which
data was available—reaching the highest percentages
recorded since the Social Security Advisory Board began
keeping such statistics in 1970.35
This unprecedented influx of applicants put increased
pressure on SSA’s already limited resources.36 SSA was
already dealing with substantial delays in processing
hearing requests, resulting in a massive “backlog.”37 In 2007,
this backlog meant a 512-day average wait from when a
34. The population from ages fifteen to sixty-four covers the vast majority of
individuals who could potentially be eligible, but not all.
35. See SSAB DATA, supra note 29, at 6 fig. 1a.
36. MINORITY STAFF REPORT, supra note 7, at 2.
37. See, e.g., 2013 Oversight Hearing, supra note 3, at 57 (statement of Glenn
E. Sklar, Deputy Comm’r, Office of Disability Adjudication and Review);
MINORITY STAFF REPORT, supra note 7, at 14.
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request for a hearing was filed to when an actual hearing
occurred.38 This meant that a claimant was waiting, on
average, nearly one and a half years to have his claim heard
by an ALJ, in addition to the amount of time that passed
while the claim was processed at the local SSA office. The
new influx of applicants during the financial crisis acted like
sand being poured into the top of an already full hourglass:
claims began to pile up as the rate of adjudication stayed the
same.
Due to the massive backlog and the negative publicity it
attracted, SSA made reducing the backlog a main priority.39
This presents the question: how does an administrative
agency faced with a shrinking budget and an unprecedented
influx of claims start processing claims faster? In a nonadversarial system where a claimant’s interests are
represented—often zealously—and the government’s are not,
the answer is obvious: eliminate the backlog by paying as
many claims as possible. That is exactly what SSA did. It
prioritized speedy adjudication over accurate adjudication
and established what has been called a “paying-down-thebacklog” policy.40 In 2008, more than 85% of all Social

38. Clearing the Disability Backlog: SSA’s Administrative Law Judge and
Hearing Office Performance, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., SOC. SEC. ADMIN.
http://oig.ssa.gov/newsroom/congressional-testimony (last visited Mar. 4, 2015).
39. MINORITY STAFF REPORT, supra note 7, at 20 (“In recent years, . . . a
concerted effort was made to reduce the growing backlog of undecided disability
applications . . . .”).
40. See 2013 Oversight Hearing, supra note 3, at 43 (statement of Hon. Larry
J. Butler), 57 (statement of Glenn E. Sklar, Deputy Comm’r, Office of Disability
Adjudication and Review).

694

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63

Security disability claims decided41 were awarded,42 and the
backlog began to decrease.43
One of the first steps in implementing the paying-downthe-backlog policy was to put pressure on the ALJs deciding
the claims. SSA began by strongly encouraging ALJs to
decide at least 500 cases per year.44 However, as Senator
Coburn explained, such a high requirement is problematic:
“Since most cases contain several hundred pages of
documents—many over 1,000 pages, including complex
medical documents—making a proper decision and
producing a high quality written description of that decision
on more than one case per day is difficult.”45 The result has
been the glut of low quality favorable decisions,46 of which
approximately 25% are erroneous.47
Another logical step SSA took in implementing its
paying-down-the-backlog policy was to encourage highproducing ALJs. For example, one particular ALJ drastically
increased his already high production, deciding 1846 cases in
2008 and 1722 in 2009.48 Senator Coburn’s investigation
41. This number refers to the number of claims decided and does not include
cases that were dismissed at the Hearing Level (i.e., claims that were filed late or
voluntarily withdrawn). The percentage of claims awarded out of all claims filed
is still greater than 75%. See infra note 42.
42. See SSAB DATA, supra note 29, at 12 fig. 7. This chart shows that 36% of
claims were awarded at the Initial Level; 14% of claims were awarded at the
Reconsideration Level; and 72.8% of the remaining claims were awarded when
decided at the Hearing Level.
43. 2013 Oversight Hearing, supra note 3, at 57 (statement of Glenn E. Sklar,
Deputy Comm’r, Office of Disability Adjudication and Review).
44. MINORITY STAFF REPORT, supra note 7, at 20.
45. Id.
46. Senator Coburn’s investigation revealed
benefit award decisions at the ALJ level were fraught with significant
problems. These problems ranged from basing decisions on evidence of
questionable value, to citing insufficient evidence to support the decision
made, misusing expert testimony, and holding perfunctory hearings. The
result was a large number of poor quality decisions, raising questions
about whether they were decided correctly.
Id.
47. See supra notes 8-12 and accompanying text.
48. MINORITY STAFF REPORT, supra note 7, at 72.
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found that this ALJ’s rate for “approving the award of
disability benefits in the cases he reviewed was similarly
high, ranging each year between 90 and 100 percent.”49 In
fact, this ALJ denied less than 1% of claims he decided in
2008.50 Notably, in years prior to 2008, this ALJ decided
approximately half as many claims per year and had a denial
rate more than ten times higher.51 So how did SSA react to
this ALJ, who was clearly operating well outside the normal
range, deciding approximately one case per hour52 and
granting nearly all of them? They started shipping him even
more claims from other offices so that he could grant them
without hearings.53 The ALJ was sent blocks of claims “from
such cities as Houston, Texas; Atlanta, Georgia; Baton
Rouge, Louisiana; Greenville, South Carolina; and Yakima,
Washington[,]” including “500 cases from Little Rock,
Arkansas—equivalent to a single judge’s workload for a
whole year.”54 Not surprisingly, the decisions issued by the
ALJ that were reviewed in Senator Coburn’s investigation
were notable for poor quality.55 They were found “not only [to]
lack[ ] sufficient judicial analysis or evidentiary support, but
were at times incomprehensible.”56
Ultimately, the paying-down-the-backlog policy has
achieved the result SSA wanted. As Deputy Commissioner
Sklar has indicated regarding policy changes implemented to
49. Id.
50. In connection with a Freedom of Information Act request made by The
Oregonian in 2008, SSA released information on ALJ statistics covering a period
ending in the late part of 2008. The data available for 2008 at the time showed
that ALJ O’Bryan decided 1690 claims, of which he denied 10. Social Security
Database, OREGONLIVE, (Dec. 29, 2008, 4:15 PM), http://www.oregonlive.com
/special/index.ssf/2008/12/social_security_database.html?appSession=300957602
64353.
51. Id.
52. The rate of approximately one case per hour assumes that this ALJ worked
eight hours per day, Monday through Friday, did not take any days off from work,
worked all federal holidays, and never took a lunch or any other break.
53. See MINORITY STAFF REPORT, supra note 7, at 75.
54. Id.
55. See id. at 72-87.
56. Id. at 72.
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improve the timeliness of adjudication: “[t]oday, the results
are clear—our plan has worked exceptionally well. . . . We
steadily reduced the wait for a hearing decision from a high
of 512 days in [fiscal year] 2007, to 375 days in [fiscal year]
2013.”57 However, one of the lasting effects of this policy is
undoubtedly the current financial distress of the Social
Security disability system as a result of an over-enrollment
of able individuals, facilitated and encouraged by the policies
discussed in this Comment.
II. THE POLICY REGARDING THE SUBMISSION
OF ADVERSE EVIDENCE
The vast majority—and in some cases all–of the evidence
in a disability claim heard by an ALJ has been obtained and
submitted by the claimant’s representative. This
arrangement works for both parties: the ALJ, who is limited
by SSA’s resources in obtaining medical records; and the
representative, who must provide sufficient evidence to
establish his client’s disability in order to be paid. However,
such an arrangement begs the question: what happens when
a representative obtains evidence adverse to his client’s
claim? Unfortunately, “what actually happens?” and “what
should happen?” have yielded different answers in the past.
However, the two questions are now being forced to
resolution in a recent revision SSA has made to its
regulations on March 20, 2015 (“the 2015 Revisions”).58 To
best address the complications and effects of SSA’s policy
regarding the submission of adverse evidence this Comment
will examine four areas. The first three areas are the
practice, the law, and the policy in effect prior to the 2015
Revisions, and the fourth is a brief look at the 2015 Revisions
themselves and how they change things.

57. 2013 Oversight Hearing, supra note 3, at 61 (statement of Glenn E. Sklar,
Deputy Comm’r, Office of Disability Adjudication and Review).
58. See Submission of Evidence in Disability Claims, 90 Fed. Reg. 14,828,
14,828 (Mar. 20, 2015).
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A. The Practice
The best way to illustrate problems with the practice of
representatives on the issue of submission of adverse
evidence is to provide a hypothetical, which is consistent with
actual practice.
John is a representative.59 He has a client, Joan, who has
filed a Social Security disability claim. Joan has been denied
at the Initial Level and the Reconsideration Level. Based on
the current evidence in Joan’s file, which includes all of the
records from her medical treatment, John characterizes
Joan’s claim as weak. He anticipates that without further
development, Joan will lose her claim at the Hearing Level.
John decides to obtain opinion evidence from the five
doctors who have treated Joan during the period of her
alleged disability. John sends requests for written reports
and the completion of questionnaires to all of these doctors.
Four of these doctors respond, including the doctor who
treats Joan most often and the doctor who specializes in the
area of Joan’s allegedly disabling impairment. Each of these
four doctors responds by affirmatively indicating, in no
uncertain terms, that it is his or her medical opinion that
Joan is not disabled.
John declines to submit any of the reports from the four
doctors to SSA and instead calls Joan and explains the
problem. He explains to Joan what is needed to establish her
disability under SSA’s rules and sends her a blank
questionnaire to bring to her fifth doctor, the one who
declined John’s initial request. He stresses the importance of
receiving a favorable response on this questionnaire to Joan
and that it would likely make the difference between her
winning and losing her claim. Joan brings the questionnaire
to her fifth doctor, who then completes it favorably—possibly
after some prodding from Joan—by checking a few boxes and
signing his name.60 John then submits the favorable report to
59. As discussed in Part III, he may or may not be an attorney. See infra text
accompanying notes 115-22.
60. SSA publishes a form, on which a medical source checks off boxes to
indicate a claimant’s limitations due to medical impairments. See OFFICE OF
DISABILITY ADJUDICATION & REVIEW, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., OMB NO. 0960-0662,

698

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63

SSA. Thereafter, SSA grants Joan’s claim by relying on the
report, never being aware of the existence of the more
detailed unfavorable reports from all of Joan’s other doctors.
The following graphic illustrates the portion of the SSA form
addressing a claimant’s ability to sit, stand, and walk.

Figure 1

The questions then become: Is what John did acceptable
practice? Does it violate the law or a code of ethics? In terms
of practice, the reality is that nearly all representatives do
not submit adverse medical and opinion evidence.61 The data
is limited on how widespread the practice is, in no small part
likely due to SSA’s lack of investigating representatives.62
However, this practice has been a concern of many ALJs who
consider it commonplace and have brought the issue to the
attention of Congress.63 Further, the practice has been, at
least, perceived by SSA to be so widespread as to warrant the
passage of the 2015 Revisions. Additionally, of note, at least
one firm has institutionalized the process of withholding
MEDICAL SOURCE STATEMENT
(PHYSICAL) (2006).

OF

ABILITY

TO DO

WORK-RELATED ACTIVITIES

61. See 2013 Oversight Hearing, supra note 3, at 3.
62. See infra Part III.B.2.
63. See, e.g., 2013 Oversight Hearing, supra note 3; infra notes 84, 87.
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adverse evidence on a large scale. That firm has developed a
policy in which all incoming evidence is reviewed and marked
with a red, yellow, or green sticker.64 Medical evidence
marked with a red sticker includes “a doctor’s opinion that a
person can still work, walk long distances[,] or lift heavy
things” and is “not handed over to [SSA].”65 The fact that this
firm is also the firm that was paid the highest amount in fees
by SSA66 should give pause to anyone considering how the
ability to take advantage of the past submission policy
encouraged profiteering.
Although determining what the practice has been is a
relatively simple matter, determining whether the practice
was actually allowed before the 2015 Revisions and what will
come of it following the revisions is more difficult.
B. The Law
Since SSA was separated from the Department of Health
and Human Services in 1994,67 it has been illegal for a
disability claimant or his representative to make false or
misleading statements to, or omit material facts from SSA
during the disability determination process.68 Section 1129 of
the
Social
Security
Independence
and
Program
69
Improvements Act of 1994 imposed civil penalties against:
[a]ny person (including an organization, agency, or other entity)
who . . . makes, or causes to be made, a statement or representation
of a material fact, for use in determining any initial or continuing
right to [disability benefits] . . . that the person knows or should
64. See Damian Paletta & Dionne Searcey, Two Lawyers Strike Gold in U.S.
Disability System, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 22, 2011), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB10001424052970203518404577096632862007046.
65. Id.
66. See infra Part III.B.3.
67. Social Security Independence and Program Improvements Act of 1994,
Pub. L. No.103-296, § 101, 108 Stat. 1464, 1465 (1994).
68. For a complete historical account of the law governing the submission of
adverse evidence to SSA, see Rains, supra note 2, at 366-82.
69. The penalties imposed by the 1994 Act were further increased in 1999 by
Section 207 of the Foster Care Independence Act of 1999. See Rains, supra
note 2, at 375.
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know is false or misleading[, or] makes such a statement . . . with
knowing disregard for the truth, or omits from a statement . . . a fact
which the person knows or should know is material shall be subject
to . . . a civil money penalty . . . .
For purposes of this section, a material fact is one which the [Secretary] may
consider in evaluating whether an applicant is entitled to benefits
under [title] II . . . or eligible for benefits or payments under [title]
XVI . . . .70

The law concerning the submission of adverse evidence
was changed with the passage of the Social Security
Protection Act of 2004 (“2004 Act”), by extending false or
misleading statements and omissions of material facts to
include those caused by failures to disclose.71 Section
201(a)(1)(C) of the 2004 Act subjects to penalty any person
who:
omits from a statement or representation for such use, or otherwise
withholds disclosure of, a fact which the person knows or should
know is material to the determination of any initial or continuing
right to or the amount of monthly insurance benefits under title II
or benefits or payments under title VIII or XVI, if the person knows,
or should know, that the statement or representation with such
omission is false or misleading or that the withholding of such
disclosure is misleading . . . .72

This law, as enacted by Congress, would seem to make
clear that a representative is required to submit all evidence
that bears on the issue of a claimant’s disability, not just
favorable evidence, and that failure to do so is cause for
sanction. However, the regulations promulgated by SSA at
the time muddied the waters. Section 404.1512 of the
regulations promulgated under the 2004 Act addressed
general evidence requirements.73 The first subsection of this
regulation—prior to the 2015 Revisions discussed below—
stated:

70. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-8 (2012) (emphasis added).
71. Pub. L. No. 108-203, § 201, 118 Stat. 493, 507 (2004) (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-8 (2012)).
72. Id. (emphasis added).
73. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512 (2014).
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In general, you have to prove to us that you are blind or disabled.
Therefore, you must bring to our attention everything that shows
that you are blind or disabled. This means that you must furnish
medical and other evidence that we can use to reach conclusions
about your medical impairment(s) and, if material to the
determination of whether you are disabled, its effect on your ability
to work on a sustained basis . . . .74

Additionally, Section 404.1740 of the regulations
addresses “[r]ules of conduct and standards of responsibility
for representatives.”75 Section 404.1740(b)(1)—before the
2015 Revisions—listed a representative’s affirmative duties
as including the obligation to:
[a]ct with reasonable promptness to obtain the information and
evidence that the claimant wants to submit in support of his or her
claim, and forward the same to us for consideration as soon as
practicable. In disability and blindness claims, this includes the
obligations to assist the claimant in bringing to our attention
everything that shows that the claimant is disabled or blind, and to
assist the claimant in furnishing medical evidence that the
claimant intends to personally provide and other evidence that we
can use to reach conclusions about the claimant’s medical
impairment(s) and, if material to the determination of whether the
claimant is blind or disabled, its effect upon the claimant’s ability
to work on a sustained basis, pursuant to § 404.1512(a).76

The language of these regulations was relied upon by
representatives to argue that they were only obligated to
submit evidence that a claimant wants submitted—obviously
excluding adverse evidence—and evidence that shows that a
claimant is disabled—not evidence that tends to show that a
claimant is not disabled.77 This interpretation was somewhat
hedged by language in that same regulation, which directs:
“[a]ll representatives must be forthright in their dealings
with us and with the claimant and must comport themselves
with due regard for the non-adversarial nature of the
proceedings by complying with our rules and standards,

74. Id. (emphasis added).
75. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1740.
76. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1740(b)(1) (emphasis added).
77. See Rains, supra note 2, at 373.
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which are intended to ensure orderly and fair presentation of
evidence and argument.”78
This portion of the regulation at least suggested a rule
against concealing adverse evidence. However, this portion of
the regulation had not been enough to overcome
representatives’ interpretation of Sections 404.1512(a) and
404.1740(b)(1). Further, an examination of SSA’s past policy
would suggest that even SSA agreed with these
representatives’ interpretation of the regulations.
C. The Policy
Prior to the 2015 Revisions, SSA’s policy on the
submission of evidence had been, at best, nebulous. Deputy
Commissioner Sklar stated in his 2013 testimony before
Congress that “[r]ight now there is some ambiguity in”
whether claimants’ representatives must submit adverse
evidence.79 He characterized the policy as a “tricky issue.”80
Based on a review of the law, the issue had been seen by
some commentators as merely an enforcement problem; the
law clearly mandated submission of adverse evidence, but
SSA did not enforce the mandate.81 ALJ Swank addressed the
issue and concluded that “there is almost no likelihood [SSA]
will . . . enforce the requirement that all evidence be
submitted . . . . As the requirement to submit adverse
evidence is never enforced, there is no need for claimants’
representatives to comply with the requirement.”82 However,
framing the issue as a lack of enforcement of a clear mandate

78. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1740(a)(2).
79. 2013 Oversight Hearing, supra note 3, at 134 (statement of Glenn E. Sklar,
Deputy Comm’r, Office of Disability Adjudication and Review). Deputy
Commissioner Sklar’s statement was given in response to the question from
Congressman Tim Walberg of Michigan, in which he asked: “are claimants and
claimants’ representatives required by law to provide complete and accurate
evidence, medical, financial[,] or other, that bears on the case, whether or not the
information is adverse, unfavorable to their claim?” Id.
80. Id.
81. See Swank, Money for Nothing, supra note 12, at 170-74.
82. Id. at 174 (emphasis added).
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ignored the complexity of the law, including the regulations
promulgated by SSA and SSA’s actual stated policy.83
The practice of withholding adverse evidence at least
appeared to be endorsed by SSA. General Counsel for SSA
has been cited by at least one firm as advising
representatives that the regulations only require claimants
to prove their disabilities, not their abilities, and
representatives may limit their submission of evidence
accordingly.84 It was also indicated that General Counsel
advised that, if faced with a request for evidence adverse to
their clients’ claims, representatives should decline the
requests on the grounds that the requested evidence does not
support the claim of disability.85 This is also how SSA’s policy
was understood by ALJs. For example, ALJ Thomas W.
Snook testified before Congress, complaining that he “[could]
not direct [claimants’ representatives] to submit all relevant
evidence, not just evidence favorable to the claimant.”86 He
indicated that under SSA’s policy, “[u]nlike other judicial
systems, . . . a [representative] only ha[d] to submit evidence
favorable to a claimant.”87 Similarly, ALJ Larry J. Butler
questioned: “[w]hy does SSA apparently continue to inform
attorneys and non-attorney representatives that withholding
material evidence that may be adverse to the claimant (that
is, suggest the claimant is not disabled) is permissible?”88

83. For SSA’s stated policy, see 2013 Oversight Hearing, supra note 3, at 134
(statement of Glenn E. Sklar, Deputy Comm’r, Office of Disability Adjudication
and Review).
84. Id. at 50 (statement of ALJ Larry J. Butler) (referring to a firm
presentation citing Sarah Humphreys of SSA’s Office of General Counsel giving
this advice before the 2004 Fifth Circuit Organization of Social Security
Claimants Representatives conference).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 104.
87. Id. at 101.
88. Id. at 49. ALJ Butler further contended that “SSA is absolutely incorrect.
An attorney cannot conceal material evidence indicating that a claimant is not
disabled and permit an ALJ—based on an incomplete and misleading record—to
erroneously award $300,000 of taxpayer funds to an individual who is not
disabled.” Id. (emphasis added).
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SSA’s apparent policy allowing the withholding of
adverse evidence was also consistent with its interpretation
of its own regulations, as evidenced by its past efforts to
amend those regulations. In 2005, then-acting Commissioner
Jo Anne B. Barnhart attempted to amend the regulations to
eliminate the withholding practice.89 As stated in the July 27,
2005 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking:
We propose to require that you submit all evidence available to you
when you request your hearing. This rule will require you to submit
all available evidence that supports the allegations that form the
basis of your claim, as well as all available evidence that might
undermine or appear contrary to your allegations. 90

It was proposed that the language of Section 404.1512(c)
should be changed.91 The relevant portion of the regulation
originally stated: “You must provide evidence, without
redaction, showing how your impairment(s) affects your
functioning during the time you say that you are disabled,
and any other information that we need to decide your
claim.”92 The amended language would have stated: “You
must provide evidence showing how your impairment(s)
affect(s) your functioning during the time you say that you
are disabled, and any other information that we need to
decide your claim, including evidence that you consider to be
unfavorable to your claim.93
Not surprisingly, the 2005 proposed amendment met
strong opposition from representatives and other
practitioners.94 At a hearing before the House Ways and
Means Subcommittee on Social Security and Human
Resources concerning the proposed amendment, thenpresident of the National Organization of Social Security
Claimants’ Representatives (“NOSSCR”) Thomas D. Sutton
89. See Administrative Review Process for Adjudicating Initial Disability
Claims, 70 Fed. Reg. 43,590, 43,606 (proposed July 27, 2005).
90. Id. at 43,602.
91. See id. at 43,606-07.
92. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(c) (2014).
93. Administrative Review Process for Adjudicating Initial Disability Claims,
70 Fed. Reg. at 43,607 (emphasis added).
94. See Rains, supra note 2, at 380.
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testified that “[f]or attorney representatives, [his
organization had] serious concerns that th[e] requirement [to
submit unfavorable evidence] may conflict with state bar
ethics rules which limit the submission of evidence that could
be considered adverse to a client.”95 This concern was
mirrored in the comments to Commissioner Barnhart from
then-president of the American Bar Association (“ABA”),
Michael S. Greco, who concluded that the proposed
amendment to the regulation would, in fact, create ethical
conflicts for attorney representatives.96 He further intimated
that complicity with the amended regulations would expose
attorney representatives to disciplinary action under their
respective state bars.97
The opposition from these interest groups and concern
about creating ethics conflicts likely contributed to the
proposed amendment eventually being rejected.98 However,
the arguments put forth by these interest groups rely on a
misunderstanding of the law. As Robert E. Rains explained
extensively in his Cornell Law Review article addressing the
subject, the bar imposed by state bars on potential federal
rules on the production of adverse evidence promulgated by
SSA is a myth.99 When a conflict exists between a federal rule
mandating disclosure of evidence that may be confidential or
otherwise protected under a state ethics rule, the federal law
takes precedence over the ethics rule, in accordance with the
Supremacy Clause.100 Professor Rains explained that such an
approach would be no different in the context of SSA
rulemaking.101 Further, in his article, he closely examined
official opinions given by various state bars on the issue of an
attorney representative submitting adverse evidence in a
95. Id. (citing Comm’r of Soc. Sec.’s Proposed Improvements to the Disability
Determination Process: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Human Res. &
Subcomm. on Soc. Sec. of the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 109th Cong. (2005)).
96. Id. at 380-81.
97. See id.
98. See id. at 381-82; see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(c) (2014).
99. See Rains, supra note 2, at 390.
100. Id. at 392.
101. See id. at 394.
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Social Security disability claim, and he showed that “none of
the opinions suggest[ ] that an attorney may violate federal
law because of a state bar ethics rule.”102 Professor Rains
ultimately concluded his article by contending that “any
ambiguity in SSA’s regulations cannot negate the clear rule
issued by Congress” in the 2004 Act.103
SSA’s policy regarding the submission of adverse
evidence historically was a “tricky” one fraught with
“ambiguity.”104 However, the uncertainty of SSA’s unclear
policy was dispelled with the 2015 Revisions, which now
clearly state SSA’s policy mandating the submission of
adverse evidence.
D. The 2015 Revisions
On March 20, 2015, SSA issued a final rule on the
submission of evidence in disability claims, effective April 20,
2015.105 The purposes of the revisions are to end the
representatives’ practice of withholding adverse evidence
and to clearly articulate SSA’s policy and rule against it.106 As
stated in the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking:
There has been recent public and media interest in what our
regulations require regarding the submission of evidence in
disability claims, particularly regarding the duty to submit
unfavorable evidence. There have been allegations that when some
representatives submit evidence to us, they deliberately withhold
evidence they deem unfavorable to the claimant. We also know,
based on our program experience, that we do not always receive
complete evidence. This public and media interest has drawn
congressional attention. In particular, members of Congress have
asked about the relationship between the Social Security Protection
102. Id. at 390.
103. Id. at 394.
104. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
105. See Submission of Evidence in Disability Claims, 80 Fed. Reg. 14,828,
14,828 (Mar. 20, 2015).
106. See Submission of Evidence in Disability Claims, 79 Fed. Reg. 9663, 9665
(proposed Feb. 20, 2014) (“We propose to revise §[ ] 404.1512(a) . . . to require you
to inform us about or submit all evidence known to you that relates to whether or
not you are blind or disabled. This would include evidence that may be either
favorable or unfavorable to your claim.”) (internal citations omitted).
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Act of 2004 (SSPA) and the duty to submit potentially unfavorable
evidence in disability claims. The SSPA authorized us to penalize a
person who withholds a fact, which the person knows or should
know is material to the determination of any initial or continuing
right to benefits. In light of congressional interest and our program
experience, we have again reviewed our regulations that govern the
submission of evidence.107

The 2015 Revisions notably changed Sections 404.1512
(Evidence) and 404.1740 (Rules of Conduct and Professional
Standards of Responsibility for Representatives).108 Section
404.1512 has been revised, in relevant part, as follows:
(a) General. In general, you have to prove to us that you are blind
or disabled. You must inform us about or submit all evidence
known to you that relates to whether or not you are blind or
disabled. This duty is ongoing and requires you to disclose any
additional related evidence about which you become aware. This
duty applies at each level of the administrative review process,
including the Appeals Council level if the evidence relates to the
period on or before the date of the administrative law judge hearing
decision. We will consider only impairment(s) you say you have or
about which we receive evidence.
(b) What we mean by “evidence.” Evidence is anything you or anyone
else submits to us or that we obtain that relates to your claim.
(1) Evidence includes, but is not limited to:
[. . .]
(ii) Other evidence from medical sources, such as medical
history, opinions, and statements about treatment you have
received . . . .109

Additionally, Section 404.1740 has been revised, in
relevant part, as follows:
(b) Affirmative duties. A representative must, in conformity with
the regulations setting forth our existing duties and responsibilities

107. Id. at 9664 (citations omitted).
108. The relevant language of these two sections prior to the 2015 Revisions is
reproduced above in Part II.B.
109. Submission of Evidence in Disability Claims, 80 Fed. Reg. at 14,836
(emphasis added).
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and those of claimants (see § 404.1512 in disability and blindness
claims):
(1) Act with reasonable promptness to help obtain the information
or evidence that the claimant must submit under our regulations,
and forward the information or evidence to us for consideration
as soon as practicable.110

The language of the changes in the 2015 Revisions makes
explicit SSA’s new rule and policy firmly against the practice
of withholding adverse evidence. But simply changing the
regulations does not fully resolve the issue. Now that the
2015 Revisions have been made and SSA has articulated a
new rule and a new policy, the question becomes: what
happens next? The new rule will likely face opposition and
potential legal challenges. In promulgating the revisions,
SSA received comments opposing the changes “from
members of the public, advocacy groups, legal organizations,
members of the disability advocacy community, and several
national
groups
of
Social
Security
claimants’
representatives.”111 The opposition from these groups is not
wholly without merit. As discussed in Part II.C, some believe
that a rule requiring attorneys to submit adverse evidence,
against the interests of their clients, would directly violate
their ethical duties.112 Although the ABA did not provide
public comment in opposition to the 2015 revisions, the
sentiment expressed in then-president Greco’s opposition to
the 2005 proposed amendment remains applicable. Mr. Greco
described the ABA’s position as follows:
[The] requirement [to submit adverse evidence in a Social Security
disability claim] has the potential for causing significant conflicts
for lawyers torn between following an agency rule and complying
with their professional responsibilities towards their clients.
Moreover, enforcement of these provisions would place the Social
Security Administration in the position of attempting to override a
lawyer's sworn duty to obey the professional rules of the jurisdiction
in which the lawyer is licensed to practice.

110. Id. at 14,837 (emphasis added).
111. Id. at 14,829.
112. See supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text.
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No matter what the tribunal, lawyers have the ethical obligation to
advocate zealously on their clients' behalf and to advise them on
possible courses of action and the potential consequences of those
actions. They are prohibited by ABA Model Rule 1.6 from disclosing
privileged and confidential client information, except with consent
from the client and under some very limited circumstances. Indeed,
to reveal client confidences would expose them to disciplinary
action.113

As discussed, a conflict between state ethical rules and a
rule from SSA mandating submission of adverse evidence
does not invalidate the SSA rule. Instead, as Professor Rains
explained, through an application of the supremacy doctrine,
the SSA rule should trump the state ethical rules.114
However, an ultimate finding that the supremacy doctrine
does allow for the rule made by the 2015 Revisions would
likely only be borne out through litigation on the subject. As
discussed, the Social Security disability practice is a billiondollar industry with some firms earning tens of millions of
dollars each year, and these firms have a great financial
interest and means to strongly oppose the rule through
extensive litigation. It is possible that the 2015 Revisions
may not have resolved the issues on the submission of
adverse evidence but are instead the beginning of the
process.
In addition to continued opposition and possible
litigation, the new rule brought about by the 2015 Revisions
may face an even greater obstacle from SSA itself. Creating
the new rule is only the first half of solving the problem—the
second half is enforcing the rule. As discussed in Part III.B.2,
SSA’s monitoring and regulation of representative
misconduct is significantly limited, and even near
nonexistent.
While implementation and enforcement of the new
regulations outlined in the 2015 Revisions will likely face
some hurdles, the revisions represent a significant change in
policy. The scope of the revisions goes far beyond the 2005
proposed amendment that failed to become a final rule. The
113. Rains, supra note 2, at 381 (quoting Letter from Michael S. Greco, Pres.,
ABA, to Hon. Jo Anne Barnhart, Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin. (Sept. 27, 2005) (on
file with Robert E. Rains)).
114. See id. at 392-94.
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fact that the 2015 Revisions have succeeded where the 2005
proposed amendment failed likely speaks to a change in the
attitudes of the general population and lawmakers in the last
ten years. There is now greater concern that the disability
programs be operated in a way that fulfills their purpose but
which is not inappropriately inclusive and exploitable.
Hopefully, the 2015 Revisions represent a turning point in
SSA policymaking and are the start of greater change.
III. POLICY REGARDING NON-ATTORNEY
REPRESENTATION BEFORE SSA
It is a well-settled doctrine that the “unauthorized
practice of law,” that is, the practice of law by people other
than attorneys, is illegal.115 It has been argued that
restricting the practice of law to attorneys is to protect the
public against “harmful incompetence and unscrupulous
conduct.”116 Despite this general rule, the practice of law by
non-attorneys has long been allowed before SSA.117 Many of
these non-attorneys have been the friends or relatives of
claimants, or have been members of a non-profit organization
or government agency.118
Although they were allowed to practice before SSA, these
non-attorneys were not treated as equal to the attorneys in
the same practice.119 Importantly, attorneys were paid fees
for their representation directly from SSA, consistent with
the fee withholding discussed in Part I.A, while non115. See Drew A. Swank, Non-Attorney Social Security Disability
Representatives and the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 36 S. ILL. U. L.J. 223, 22425 (2012) [hereinafter Swank, Unauthorized Practice of Law].
116. Id. at 228 (quoting Derek A. Denckla, Nonlawyers and the Unauthorized
Practice of Law: An Overview of the Legal and Ethical Parameters, 67 FORDHAM
L. REV. 2581, 2594 (1999)).
117. See Swank, Unauthorized Practice of Law, supra note 115, at 234.
118. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-5, SSA DISABILITY
REPRESENTATIVES: FEE PAYMENT CHANGES SHOW PROMISE, BUT ELIGIBILITY
CRITERIA AND REPRESENTATIVE OVERPAYMENTS REQUIRE FURTHER MONITORING 1314, 17 (2007) [hereinafter 2007 GAO REPORT] (indicating that “[a]bout half” of all
ineligible nonattorneys “are claimants’ relatives and friends[,]” and half of the
remaining amount “work for non[-]profit organizations or government agencies”).
119. See Swank, Unauthorized Practice of Law, supra note 115, at 239-40.

2015]

LAST DAYS OF SOCIAL SECURITY

711

attorneys were not.120 However, more recently, congressional
legislation has elevated eligible non-attorney representatives
(“NARs”) to the same level as attorneys by extending to them
fee withholding.121 It is my contention that these eligible
NARs have contributed to the current financial distress and
institutional failures of SSA. They are on the whole less
qualified to practice than attorneys, are essentially
unregulated, and have contributed to the proliferation of
profiteering entities in Social Security disability practice.
These characteristics of eligible NARs are addressed below,
following a brief history of non-attorney representation
before SSA and the laws that created eligible NARs.
A. A Brief History of Non-Attorney Representation before
the Social Security Administration and the Laws that
Created Eligible NARs
The practice of law by non-attorneys before federal
administrative agencies like SSA has been allowed since the
enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) in
1946.122 The APA allowed each federal agency to determine
who may represent others before it—allowing each agency to
allow non-attorneys to practice before it, if the agency so
chose.123 Soon after the passage of the APA, conflicts arose
between
non-attorneys
practicing
before
federal
administrative agencies and state bar associations.124 Bar
associations petitioned state courts to hold non-attorneys in
contempt for the unauthorized practice of law and to enjoin
them from practicing law in the state.125 The apparent
inconsistency between the APA allowing non-attorney
practice and the state bars’ position that such practice was
illegal unauthorized practice of law was finally resolved by

120. See id.
121. See infra Part III.A.
122. See Swank, Unauthorized Practice of Law, supra note 115, at 235.
123. Id.
124. See Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379 (1963).
125. See id.; Swank, Unauthorized Practice of Law, supra note 115, at 236.
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the Supreme Court in Sperry v. Florida.126 There, Chief
Justice Warren framed the issue as falling under the
Supremacy Clause.127 In the eyes of the Court, there was no
doubt that the APA allowed non-attorneys to practice
irrespective of state bar licensing requirements:
The statute thus expressly permits the Commissioner to authorize
practice before the [administrative agency] by non-lawyers, and the
Commissioner has explicitly granted such authority. If the
authorization is unqualified, then, by virtue of the Supremacy
Clause, [states] may not deny to those failing to meet [their] own
qualifications the right to perform the functions within the scope of
the federal authority. A State may not enforce licensing
requirements which, though valid in the absence of federal
regulation, give “the State’s licensing board a virtual power of
review over the federal determination” that a person or agency is
qualified and entitled to perform certain functions, or which impose
upon the performance of activity sanctioned by federal license
additional conditions not contemplated by Congress. “No State law
can hinder or obstruct the free use of a license granted under an act
of Congress.”128

Since the Court’s decision, non-attorney practice before
SSA has been commonplace.129 However, the nature of their
representation has changed significantly in recent years.
This change occurred with the passage of the 2004 Act.130
Section 303 of the 2004 Act established a five-year
demonstration project for extending fee withholding to NARs
who met certain requirements.131 This project made these
NARs (“eligible NARs”) indistinguishable from attorneys in
practice before SSA; they essentially were afforded all of the
126. 373 U.S. 379; Swank, Unauthorized Practice of Law, supra note 115,
at 235.
127. See Sperry, 373 U.S. at 385.
128. Id. (internal citations omitted).
129. For the period from 1977 through 2010, there was nonattorney
participation, on average, at 15.7% of all Social Security disability hearings. See
SSAB DATA, supra note 29, at 60 fig. 55 (“Cases with Representation at ALJ
Hearings—Fiscal Years 1977-2010.”).
130. See Pub. L. No. 108-203, 118 Stat. 493 (2004) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 1305 (2012)).
131. Id. § 303 (“Nationwide Demonstration Project Providing for Extension of
Fee Withholding Procedures to Non-attorney Representatives.”).
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rights and all of the benefits, including the very desirable
direct payment of fees from SSA.132
SSA began implementing the application procedures for
qualifying as an eligible NAR in 2005,133 and soon NARs were
becoming certified as eligible and being paid fees directly
from SSA. Over the next few years, the project gained
momentum and was generally considered by Congress to be
a success.134 Because the initial demonstration project was
only authorized for a five-year period, Congress passed the
Social Security Disability Applicants’ Access to Professional
Representation Act of 2010 (“2010 Act”) to “provide for
permanent extension of [fee withholding procedures] . . . to
qualified non-attorney representatives.”135 Since the passage
of the 2010 Act, more and more NARs are becoming certified
by SSA, often supplanting attorneys in the process.
B. The Issues with Eligible NARs and the Effects of Their
Existence
This Comment focuses on three areas in which the
eligible NAR program has had either a demonstrable or
potential negative impact on the Social Security disability
system: (1) eligible NARs are less qualified to practice than
attorneys; (2) they are essentially unregulated; and (3) they
have contributed to the proliferation of profiteering entities
in the field. These three factors have created a class of
representatives—growing in size—that have been in a
position to exploit the current situation of SSA.
1. Eligible NARs May Not Be as “Qualified” as Congress
Intended. The current legislation providing direct payment
for eligible NARs elevates those representatives to the same
level as attorneys, making the two indistinguishable in
practice before SSA. Because of this fact and the fact that
non-attorney representation is the exception not the rule, the
question as to whether eligible NARs are qualified must be
132. Id.
133. See Demonstration Project for Direct Payment to Non-Attorney
Representatives, 70 Fed. Reg. 2447, 2447-50 (proposed Jan. 13, 2005).
134. See infra Part III.C. Though, as discussed in Part III.B.1, it is unclear by
what standards the project was considered a success.
135. Pub. L. No. 111-142, 124 Stat. 38, 38 (2010).
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framed in terms of whether they are as qualified as attorneys
practicing in the same field, not whether they are more
qualified than laypersons.
Under the 2004 Act, NARs are only eligible for direct
payment of fees if they meet certain requirements. Therefore,
any discussion of qualifications must start with a discussion
of these requirements. The 2004 Act contains five
requirements that must be met: (1) “[t]he representative has
been awarded a bachelor’s degree . . . [;]” (2) “[t]he
representative has passed an examination, written and
administered by the Commissioner, which tests knowledge of
the relevant provisions of the Social Security Act . . . [;]” (3)
the representative must be insured; (4) the representative
must pass a background check; and (5) the representative
must participate in continuing education as the
Commissioner may prescribe.136
The standard initially promulgated under the 2004 Act
also required an experience component—an applicant was
required to represent at least five claimants before SSA in
the 24-month period prior to applying.137 To be considered to
have represented a claimant, an applicant must have been
the appointed representative at the time a decision was
issued or appeared at a hearing before an ALJ.138 Notably,
however, the experience requirement was eliminated from
the current scheme implemented under the 2010 Act.
SSA’s abandonment of the experience requirement is
contrary to the recommendation provided by the United
States Government Accountability Office (“GAO”). Section
304 of the 2004 Act required a “GAO Study Regarding the
Fee Payment Process for Claimant Representatives” to be
136. § 303, 118 Stat. at 521-22.
137. See SOC. SEC. ADMIN., OMB NO. 0960-0699,
REPRESENTATIVE DEMONSTRATION PROJECT, 1-2 (2006).

NON-ATTORNEY

138. Id. at 2 (“Representing a claimant before SSA can count toward satisfaction
of the representational requirement only if the applicant was serving as the
claimant’s appointed representative at the time at which SSA decided the case at
any administrative level (i.e. the initial, reconsideration, ALJ hearing, or Appeals
Council level) or, if the case has not been decided while the applicant was the
appointed representative, the applicant appeared as the claimant’s appointed
representative at a hearing before an ALJ . . . .”).
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performed.139 Section 304(a)(2)(D) stated in pertinent part
that the study should assess the potential results of creating
eligible NARs with respect to program administration “and
assess whether the rules and procedures employed by the
Commissioner of Social Security to evaluate the
qualifications and performance of claimant representatives
should be revised prior to making such procedures
permanent.”140 The GAO complied with this requirement and
issued a report to congressional committees in 2007. The
September 2007 report, SSA Disability Representatives: Fee
Payment Changes Show Promise, but Eligibility Criteria and
Representative Overpayments Require Further Monitoring,141
identified a number of issues, but the most significant was
the experience requirement. The GAO found that “the
[m]inimum
[e]xperience
[r]equirement
[m]ay
[b]e
[i]nsufficient,”142 writing in part:
We found that judges . . . in addition to advocacy groups we spoke
with, questioned the adequacy of the experience standard, which
calls for nonattorneys to have represented at least five claimants
before SSA over a 2-year period. Most of the judges we interviewed
and more than half of the eligible nonattorneys considered this to
be insufficient experience. Judges, and also advocacy groups we
spoke with, said that the standard would not ensure that eligible
nonattorneys are well qualified in disability representation.143

The GAO further noted that “according to an association
of representatives, fee withholding is attracting more
inexperienced non-attorneys to the field of disability
representation.”144 The report ultimately concluded with the
concern that, in light of the availability of fee withholding
drawing more non-attorneys into the field, the then-existing
“experience standard set by SSA may not be sufficiently

139. § 304, 118 Stat. at 523-24.
140. Id. § 304(a)(2)(D).
141. 2007 GAO REPORT, supra note 118.
142. Id. at 26.
143. Id. at 4 (emphasis added).
144. Id. at Highlights.
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rigorous to ensure that representatives are well qualified.”145
Inexplicably, after the 2010 Act came into effect, SSA
eliminated the experience standard as a requirement in
becoming an eligible NAR. This elimination was made while,
just as the GAO report predicted, the number of eligible
NARs entering the field, attracted by direct payment, had
exploded.146 These eligible NARs are, at best, questionably
qualified based on the findings of the GAO.
Considering that now an individual with an
undergraduate degree in any field—it is irrelevant whether
it is in philosophy or electrical engineering—can be eligible
for direct payment without any relevant experience, the only
one of the requirements that really establishes whether an
individual is competent to practice before SSA is the written
examination. Therefore, the qualification of these eligible
NARs is predicated on the quality of the examination they
must pass. Congress has left the nature and the format of the
examination to the discretion of the Commissioner of Social
Security, who has since contracted with CPS HR Consulting
to administer it.147
In its current form, the eligible NAR examination is three
hours long, open-book—applicants are provided with a copy
of the Code of Federal Regulations for Parts 400 to 499
(“Code”)—and contains between forty and fifty multiplechoice questions.148 The questions test information contained
in the provided Code and cover four areas: disability,
vocational, appeals, and ethics.149 To pass, applicants need to
145. Id. at 35 (“To the extent that the availability of fee withholding draws more
nonattorneys into the field of disability representation for the first time, it is
possible that in the future some less qualified nonattorneys could satisfy the
criteria.”).
146. See infra Part III.C.
147. Direct Payment to Non-Attorney Representatives: General Information, CPS
HR CONSULTING: SOC. SEC. ADMIN., https://secure.cpshr.us/ssa/About.asp (last
visited Mar. 5, 2015).
148. Direct Payment to Non-Attorney Representatives: Examination, CPS HR
CONSULTING: SOC. SEC. ADMIN., https://secure.cpshr.us/ssa/Examination.asp (last
visited Mar. 5, 2015) [hereinafter Non-Attorney Representatives: Examination].
149. Direct Payment to Non-Attorney Representatives: Sample Examination
Questions, CPS HR CONSULTING: SOC. SEC. ADMIN., https://secure.cpshr.us/ssa/
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answer at least 70% of the questions correctly.150 I contend
that such an examination alone is inadequate to establish an
applicant’s competency and qualification to be a NAR, based
on both the format of the examination and its grading
structure.
In terms of the examination format, it is too generous to
applicants. Three hours to answer up to fifty simple multiplechoice questions—for which the reference book is provided—
is not sufficient to establish competency, especially in light of
the fact that an applicant will still pass if he answers nearly
one-third of the questions incorrectly.151 As a point of
illustration, the following is an example of a representative
examination question:
Which statement best describes the term “severe” impairment?
[Answer choice C is the correct answer].
a. A combination of unrelated non-severe impairments with
no impact on basic work activity may be considered a severe
impairment because having multiple non-severe impairments
can be much worse than having just one.
b. A medically determinable impairment or a combination of
impairments which prevents the ability to perform
substantial gainful activity is considered “severe.”
c. An impairment or combination of impairments is
only severe if the impairment significantly impacts at
least one basic work activity.
d. An impairment or combination of impairments is
considered severe only if the impairment impacts several
basic work activities.152

The answer to this question may not be plainly obvious,
but finding its answer is not difficult using the copy of the
Code provided to the applicants. The copy of the Code
PracticeExam.asp (last visited Mar. 5, 2015) [hereinafter Non-Attorney
Representatives: Sample Questions].
150. Non-Attorney Representatives: Examination, supra note 148.
151. See id.
152. Non-Attorney
(emphasis added).

Representatives:

Sample

Questions,

supra

note

149
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provided includes an index at the beginning.153 Under the
bolded section “Determining Disability and Blindness”
(Subpart P), is a subheading, “Evaluation of Disability.”154
This subheading has five regulations listed, including
Section 404.1521: “What we mean by an impairment(s) that
is not severe.”155 If one were to turn to that section of the Code,
he would find the following directly under the bolded
heading: “Non-severe impairment(s). An impairment or
combination of impairments is not severe if it does not
significantly limit your physical or mental ability to do basic
work activities.”156
It is not my position that a layperson with no familiarity
with Social Security disability could take the examination
and pass solely on the basis that it is multiple choice and
open-book, though it may be possible, in light of the fact that
the person would be allowed to answer nearly one-third of the
questions incorrectly. It is, however, my position that an
individual of average intelligence could spend a period of a
week or two going through the Code, especially learning the
index, and would have a reasonable chance of passing the
examination. That such an individual, who prior to those two
weeks had no familiarity with SSA or its procedures, is
deemed more than just competent to practice before SSA but
is certified to be of the same competence as an attorney also
so practicing is alarming. It bears noting that with the
rescission of the experience requirement, this hypothetical
applicant may have, and likely has, never been inside a court
room, never appeared before an ALJ, never seen medical
records, and never so much as met a disabled potential client.
In terms of the grading, the examination is not
comprehensive. As discussed above, the questions fall into
four evenly distributed categories: disability, vocational,
appeals, and ethics. In grading the examination, an applicant
must achieve a score of 70% or better; however, there is no
minimum score that must be achieved in each separate
category. Therefore, because each category represents 25% of
153. See 20 C.F.R. Ch. III, pts. 400-99 (2013).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1521(a).
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the examination and an applicant may answer up to 30% of
the examination incorrectly, an applicant will be certified by
SSA even if he answers all of the questions in a particular
section incorrectly—as well as some in other sections. For
example, SSA will still deem an applicant who answers 0% of
the ethics questions correctly to be competent.
It is my contention that the examination procedures for
NAR certification are plainly inadequate in establishing an
applicant’s competency. The inadequacy of the examination
is especially troublesome in light of the fact that this
requirement is the only requirement that establishes an
applicant’s qualifications as an eligible NAR. My contention
is not based solely on the logical conclusion that some
applicants subject to inadequate certification procedures will
invariably be unqualified; it is, in fact, supported by available
empirical evidence, which shows that NARs are less qualified
than attorneys and more likely to engage in misconduct.
In September of 2007, the Office of the Inspector General
(“OIG”) for SSA issued a report addressing data about
claimants’ representatives’ misconduct.157 The report
explained that SSA maintains a list of representatives who
have been sanctioned, defined as either disqualified or
suspended from practice before SSA.158 The list includes all
representatives who had been sanctioned since 1980.159 As
the below figure from the OIG report shows, NARs are more
likely to be sanctioned than attorneys.

157. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., SOC. SEC. ADMIN., A-12-07-17057,
CLAIMANT REPRESENTATIVES BARRED FROM PRACTICING BEFORE THE SOCIAL
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION (2007) [hereinafter 2007 OIG REPORT], available at
http://oig.ssa.gov/sites/default/files/audit/full/pdf/A-12-07-17057_0.pdf.
158. Id. at 4.
159. See Drew A. Swank, The Social Security Administration’s Condoning of
and Colluding with Attorney Misconduct, 64 ADMIN. L. REV. 507, 519-20 (2012)
[hereinafter Swank, Condoning and Colluding] (referring to the 2011 list, on file
with author).
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Figure 2: Sanctioned Representatives at SSA (as of May 2007)

The figure would make it seem at first glance that NARs
are almost twice as likely to be sanctioned when compared to
attorneys. However, the reality is far worse. The OIG report
explained that in 2006, there were 31,000 claimant
representatives, of which approximately 26,000 were
attorneys and 5000 were NARs.160 Therefore, considering
there was more than five times the number of attorneys
compared to NARs,161 the data actually indicates that NARs
are approximately nine times more likely to be sanctioned
than attorneys.
Therefore, knowing that NARs are generally less
qualified than attorneys and are more likely to engage in
misconduct, the question must be asked: how does SSA deal
with this misconduct? The answer, as addressed below, is
that it essentially doesn’t.
2. Eligible NARs Operate in Limbo Free from Regulation
of Misconduct. The practice of law by attorneys has often
been considered a self-regulating profession. Yet the reality
160. 2007 OIG REPORT, supra note 157, at 1 n.3.
161. The historic data maintained by the Social Security Advisory Board
regarding representative attendance at ALJ hearings also supports a general
ratio of between 5:1 and 4:1 for attorneys to NARs since 1980. See SSAB DATA,
supra note 29, at 60 fig.55 (“Cases with Representation at ALJ Hearings—Fiscal
Years 1977-2010.”).
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is that the practice is regulated in many ways, most notably
by state bars. However, eligible NARs practicing before SSA
are not subject to the same regulatory scheme, which has
developed over decades to police attorney misconduct. Rather
than giving my explanation of the dangers of creating eligible
NARs that exist outside of the usual regulatory framework, I
provide, in part, the testimony regarding this issue that
Congress heard before passing the 2004 Act. On February 27,
2003, Richard P. Morris, then-president of NOSSCR,
testified before Congress regarding the legislation that would
become the 2004 Act:
The actions of attorneys also are more heavily regulated and face
greater scrutiny than the actions of unaffiliated non-attorney
representatives. States have enacted institutional controls to
govern the conduct of professionals such as attorneys. The only
controls that exist for non-attorney representatives are two short
pages of regulations entitled “Rules of Conduct and Standards of
Responsibility for Representatives.” By contrast, attorneys and
paralegals they supervise must comply with both these Social
Security Administration standards and state bar codes of conduct,
which are much more stringent and impose much more severe
punishments for violations. While the Social Security
Administration standards for non-attorney representatives do
provide a starting point, the standards are general and, to date,
enforcement has been limited. In contrast, state institutional
controls provide many protections for disability claimants who are
represented by attorneys and those paralegals they supervise.
Because unaffiliated non-attorney representatives do not fall under
the purview of such institutional controls, claimants do not have
many protections from unscrupulous non-attorney representatives.
In order to practice law, attorneys must swear to abide by the
ethical code of the state in which they practice. Failure to abide by
such codes will result in fines, censure, or even disbarment. In
contrast, non-attorney representatives are not under any similar
ethical standards promulgated by a licensing body. . . .
More troubling, if an unaffiliated, non-attorney representative
behaves unethically the client has no direct recourse. The client
cannot bring a charge against the non-attorney representative
before an ethics committee because such a committee does not exist.
The client is limited to complaining to the Social Security
Administration, which may or may not bring a charge against the
non-attorney representative. Surprisingly, the Social Security
Administration has no obligation to investigate a charge of
misfeasance or malfeasance against a non-attorney representative,
unlike a state bar commission of professional conduct which is
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required by law to conduct an investigation of any charge of
wrongdoing. Thus, the state licensing scheme for attorneys
provides clients with direct recourse if they have a complaint. 162

Because eligible NARs operate outside of the complex
system designed for policing attorneys, any regulation of
their conduct must come from SSA. However, Mr. Morris’s
concerns about SSA’s lack of obligation to investigate eligible
NARs have proven to be true. SSA’s regulation of eligible
NARs is all but nonexistent. As was discussed in the
Introduction, SSA lacks the funding necessary to administer
some of its most essential functions. The result is a lack of
resources for and a deprioritizing of monitoring and
regulating representative misconduct.163 While, as discussed
in Part III.B.1, NARs are much more likely to be sanctioned
than attorneys, the overall likelihood of them being
sanctioned at all is remarkably low.164 From 1980 through
2011, a total of 101 NARs were sanctioned. 165 This results in
an average rate of 0.06% NARs being sanctioned per year.166
As one commentator has noted, such a rate is drastically
lower than the general rates of attorney disbarment—not
just disciplinary action—in individual states.167 Considering
that disbarment by a state bar has been historically very
unlikely,168 the fact that an NAR is only a fraction as likely to
be sanctioned highlights just how unlikely disciplinary action
is. Moreover, it is worth noting that sanctioning is not always
the result of internal inquiry by SSA and is sometimes
precipitated by the offender representative being the subject
of outside proceedings, such as conviction of a crime and
162. The Social Security Protection Act of 2003: Hearing on H.R. 743 Before the
Subcomm. on Soc. Sec. of the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 108th Cong. 53-54
(2003) (statement of Richard P. Morris, Pres., NOSSCR) (emphasis added).
163. See Swank, Condoning and Colluding, supra note 159, at 518-19.
164. See id. at 519-20.
165. Id.
166. With a total of 101 NARs being sanctioned in the 32 years from 1980
through 2011, an average of 3.16 NARs were sanctioned per year. Assuming an
average of 5000 NARs practicing per year, based on the 2007 OIG REPORT, supra
note 157, 3.16 NARs of the 5000 represents the rate of 0.063%.
167. See Swank, Condoning and Colluding, supra note 159, at 520.
168. Id.
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incarceration.169 Therefore, the actual rate of NARs
sanctioned by SSA for misconduct in practice—as opposed to
other reasons like incarceration—may in fact be much lower.
By being free from the self-governing, attorney-policing
scheme and being subject only to very limited SSA
sanctioning, eligible NARs operate in a sort of lawless crack
in the system. However, the fact that these eligible NARs are
laypersons and not attorneys does not mitigate the harm that
can be done by their misconduct, both to their individual
clients and to SSA itself.
3. Eligible NARs Contribute to the Rise of Social Security
Disability “Mega-firms.” The factors that have led to the
current unfortunate state of SSA (i.e., evidence submission
policy, lack of oversight of representatives, and paying-downthe-backlog scheme) have also created a great opportunity for
profit. In 2013, SSA paid $1,226,129,697.74 in fees to
claimants’ representatives.170 This large aggregate of fee
payments has led to the propagation of so-called “megafirms.”171 These mega-firms specialize in Social Security
disability and have developed assembly line processes to
maximize profit. Congress’s creation of eligible NARs has
been essential to such firms’ proliferation.
In December of 2011, the Wall Street Journal profiled the
firm that was paid the highest fees by SSA the prior year;
those fees added up to $88 million.172 The fees the firm
received that year were triple what it received in 2006.173 This
growth was, in part, attributable to the 2004 Act creating
169. See Swank, Money for Nothing, supra note 12, at 173.
170. See Statistics on Title II Direct Payments to Claimant Representatives, SOC.
SEC. ADMIN., http://www.ssa.gov/representation/statistics.htm#sb=3 (last visited
Mar. 6, 2015) [hereinafter Statistics on Title II Direct Payments]. This amount
represents fee payments only on Title II claims (commonly Disability Insurance
claims) but does not include amounts paid on Title XVI claims (Supplemental
Security Income). Therefore, the overall fee payment amount would be higher.
171. 2013 Oversight Hearing, supra note 3, at 101. The Honorable Thomas W.
Snook discussed the existence of high volume, profit-driven firms specializing in
Social Security disability and also made specific mention of the firm profiled in
Paletta & Searcey, supra note 64.
172. Paletta & Searcey, supra note 64.
173. Id.
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eligible NARs and to the changes that occurred as a result of
the 2008 financial crisis. In response to the 2004 Act “making
it easier for non[-]lawyer advocates to get paid[,]” the firm
“hired lower-paid nonlawyers [eligible NARs] to handle
cases, ramped up advertising and began processing far
greater numbers of clients.”174 The result has been a profitsdriven, assembly line approach to the practice with some
corners being cut and perhaps even lines being crossed.175 A
former manager at one of the firm’s many offices “describe[d]
the operation as ‘like a warehouse’ with the goal of seeing
‘how much money they can make.’”176
The firm profiled in the Wall Street Journal article is by
no means unique. The article made clear mention that other
firms rely on eligible NARs and have similarly specialized
high volume practices, including one in California run by an
individual who was the sixth highest paid representative
that year.177 Further, the success of these current firms is
likely to cause even more such groups to enter the field. ALJs
interviewed in connection with the article were concerned
about such a possibility and cautioned that the firm profiled
had “creat[ed] a model that many competitors are working to
mirror.”178
Why have these mega-firms transitioned to the use of
eligible NARs, and how has the transition helped proliferate
their existence? One commentator has put it bluntly:
“[m]oney, of course, is the motivation for firms to hire nonattorney representatives over attorneys . . . . [T]he firm has
a greater profit using non-attorney representatives, as the
firm would pay them less, on average, than attorneys.”179
174. Id.
175. The firm has institutionalized the practice of withholding unfavorable
evidence with a color-coded sticker system discussed at supra notes 64-65 and
accompanying text. It has been reprimanded by SSA for backdating documents,
and, at the time of the article, was being investigated for possibly forging
signatures. Paletta & Searcey, supra note 64.
176. Paletta & Searcey, supra note 64.
177. See id.
178. Id.
179. Swank, Unauthorized Practice of Law, supra note 115, at 243.
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However, the answer may actually be more complicated.
While the cheaper supply of labor available with the use of
eligible NARs may be helpful to a mega-firm’s bottom line,
their use may actually be necessary for a mega-firm’s
existence. The firm profiled by the Wall Street Journal is a
firm only in the sense that it is a business conglomerate; it is
not a law firm. In 2010, after the passage of the 2010 Act, the
owners of the firm sold a majority stake in the firm to a
private equity company,180 making it no longer a law firm.181
The law prohibits a nonlawyer to own any interest in a law
firm or to manage or supervise the professional activities of
a lawyer.182 The purpose for this prohibition is to limit a profit
seeking entity, unbound by ethical obligations, from directing
the actions of lawyers bound to resolve ethical conflicts
arising from the pursuit of profits in favor of ethical
outcomes.183 Thus, a mega-firm, such as the one profiled,
would not be able to exist without the existence of eligible
NARs who can be controlled by profit-seeking groups like
private equity companies.
It is clear that eligible NARs are contributing to the
existence of mega-firms, and in some cases are necessary to
their existence. In considering whether such contribution is
as detrimental to the system as some of the other issues
discussed above, I share Judge Snook’s concern: “is this really
what Congress intended, that disability law firms be owned
by hedge funds?”184 Should profit-seeking entities, unfettered
180. Paletta & Searcey, supra note 64.
181. The firm explains on its website that it is not a law firm and that its
representatives are not lawyers. Under the heading on the main page, “Social
Security Disability Attorney vs. Social Security Disability Advocate,” the firm
explains: “We are America’s Most Successful Social Security Disability
Advocates®. While very similar to a Social Security Disability lawyer, by
definition an advocate is ‘one that argues for a cause; one that pleads in another’s
behalf; a supporter.’” BINDER & BINDER, http://www.binderandbinder.com (last
visited Mar. 6, 2015).
182. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAW § 10 (2000) (“A nonlawyer
may not own any interest in a law firm, and a nonlawyer may not be empowered
to or actually direct or control the professional activities of a lawyer in the firm.”).
183. See id. § 10 cmts. b–c.
184. 2013 Oversight Hearing, supra note 3, at 101.
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by the ethical constraints built through history that govern
lawyers, be allowed to participate in the practice of law?
C. If There are So Many Problems with Eligible NARs, Why
Did Congress Pass the 2010 Act?
Why did a Congress infamous for political gridlock and
inaction overwhelmingly support the 2010 Act,185 an act that
did little more than make permanent the eligible NAR
program put into effect by the 2004 Act? The reasons shown
by the limited congressional record are twofold. First, the bill
was seen as a basic reform, which would not harm benefits
recipients—potential voters—to a system in need of reform.
As Senator Max Baucus from Montana explained the law:
“This bill unifies the attorney and nonattorney fee
withholding process for both Social Security and
supplemental security income. The bill is a commonsense
reform to the Social Security Act and should be enacted.”186
The second, and arguably more substantial, reason for
passing the 2010 Act was that Congress perceived that
passing the law would increase claimants’ access to
representation. As Congresswoman Laura Richardson of
California urged:
[t]he provisions set to be extended by H.R. 4532 will provide easy
access to the qualified representation that many seniors need in
order to secure their benefits. This legislation is especially
important in these tough economic times . . . . Now, more than ever,
we need to help the elderly access the benefits that they need to
achieve financial stability . . . . I support this bill because it will
make the Social Security system more fair and easy to use for the
63,000 seniors in my district and millions more across the country.
In order to uphold our obligation to senior citizens we must provide
them with the resources needed to take advantage of available
benefits.187

185. The bill was passed by a vote of 412 yeas to 6 nays in the House of
Representatives. 156 CONG. REC. H594 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 2010). This support was
not dissimilar from the support for the 2004 Act, which was passed by the House
with a vote of 402 yeas to 19 nays. 150 CONG. REC. H437 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 2004).
186. 156 CONG. REC. S673 (daily ed. Feb. 22, 2010).
187. 156 CONG. REC. H2034-35 (daily ed. Feb. 25, 2010).
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Despite the perception of some legislators, the reality is
that access to representation was not a real issue at the time,
nor is it now. In actuality, when the first act was passed in
2004, nearly all claimants for Social Security disability
benefits were represented.188 This fact is a logical result
considering that, at that time, SSA paid out over $700 million
to claimants’ representatives—all of whom eligible for such
payment at the time were attorneys—that year.189 This
amount of money paid in a non-adversarial system, which is
now a billion-dollar industry,190 had apparently proven
incentive enough for many attorneys.
While the supposed need for increased access to
representation perceived by Congress was not a reality, the
acts it has passed have created a need for access to attorney
representation. Since the implementation of the 2004 Act,
which began to take significant effect in 2006, there has been
a dramatic increase in the volume of NARs, at the cost of a
decrease in the volume of attorneys. As shown by the data
maintained by the Social Security Advisory Board, the
percentage of attorneys present at disability hearings has
decreased 7.7%, while the percentage of NARs has increased
by a whopping 224%.191
Year

Attorney

Non-Attorney

2006

80.9%

8.6%

2007

81.3%

8.6%

2008

78.0%

9.3%

2009

74.5%

10.6%

2010

74.6%

19.3%
Table 2

188. In 2004, attorneys were present at 72.6% of ALJ hearings, and nonattorneys were present at 13.8%. See SSAB DATA, supra note 29, at 60 fig. 55
(“Cases with Representation at ALJ Hearings—Fiscal Years 1977-2010.”).
189. See Statistics on Title II Direct Payments, supra note 170.
190. See id.
191. See SSAB DATA, supra note 29, at 60 fig. 55 (“Cases with Representation
at ALJ Hearings—Fiscal Years 1977-2010.”).
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While this data is only current through 2010, it is likely
that the volume of attorneys has continued to decline as that
of NARs has increased. As discussed in Part III.B.3, the
passage of the 2010 Act, making the eligible NAR program
permanent, has lead to the involvement of profit-seeking
entities like private equity companies participating in the
field; where such participation exists, the use of eligible
NARs is essential.
CONCLUSION
The Social Security disability system is a sinking ship.
We need to plug as many holes as possible in order to protect
those who truly need to be in the ship. Exactly 10,569,361
people have been awarded Social Security disability benefits
from the start of 2008 through the end of 2014.192 If only 1%
of those awards were achieved as a result of the policies
outlined in this Comment, that would still represent a bill of
$31,708,083,000 over the period of benefits payment.193
SSA has made a significant change to its policy on the
submission of adverse evidence with the 2015 Revisions.
However, this change is still new, untested, and likely subject
to further opposition. SSA should continue down the path
started by the revisions, but it must now take steps to ensure
that the new rule it created is followed.
The eligible NAR program should be ended, or at least
altered, to place eligible NARs in a position lower than
attorneys. Eligible NARs were created in response to a
problem that did not exist: the absence of available
representatives. Now, these eligible NARs are less qualified
than attorneys practicing in the field, and they are more
likely to perpetrate misconduct, yet they operate outside the
scope of any likely discipline. Ending the program would
simply end the problems caused by this representative class.
One way to address the problem would be to reduce the fee
payable to these representatives. If the fee cap were reduced
below $6000 for eligible NARs but remained the same for
192. See Benefits Awards by Type of Beneficiary, SOC. SEC. ADMIN.,
http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/ProgData/awards.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2015).
193. Assuming the average beneficiary receives $300,000 over the period of
benefits payment. See CONN LAW FIRM CASE STUDY, supra note 12, at 5.
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attorneys, NARs would be a less viable labor force for
profiteering entities like private equity companies that
employ them. This may slow or taper the influx of these
representatives into the field while still encouraging attorney
practice. However, such a response may actually increase
eligible NAR practice by making them a more attractive
representative option for claimants who generally rely on
advertising in choosing a representative194 and may be
enticed by the lower fee, ignorant of the actual cost of that
lower fee. The only real solution to the problems of the
eligible NAR class of representatives is to end the program
creating the class.
Though in this Comment I have painted the situation of
Social Security disability as dire and the system as dying, I
believe that reformation of the two problematic polices
addressed in this Comment represent a cost-effective way to
start righting the ship. Therefore, I end this Comment with
the same sentiment of the fund’s Board of Trustees from their
recent report, which outlined the system’s imminent
financial shortfall: “With informed discussion, creative
thinking, and timely legislative action, Social Security can
continue to protect future generations.”195

194. Notably, the highest paid Social Security disability firm, which also relies
on eligible NARs as a labor force and is owned by a private equity company, spent
“more than $20 million on TV ads” in 2010. Paletta & Searcey, supra note 64.
195. 2013 BOARD OF TRUSTEES REPORT, supra note 4, at 5.

